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where the contract was made should govern its validity,2 ' and this
seems to be the modern weight of authority." The rule is based on
sound principles of law most important of which is that only by the
law of the place where the acts took place could it be determined
whether they had any legal effect." In other words, unless the acts
of the parties had the legal effect of creating a contract in the state
where they occurred there could be no contract to enforce in another
state. Furthermore, as a practical matter, the easiest law to apply is
that under which the parties acted because, having determined where
the contract was made, that law follows as a part of the contract.,
And lastly, this rule entails none of the uncertainties which follow the
rule that the place of performance shall govern or the rule that the
intention of the parties should control. If the intention of the parties
is to govern there might be a conflict of evidence on the matter, or a
conflict of intention, and the court would be forced to choose between
conflicting laws. If the law of the place of performance is to govern
the performance might extend over two or more jurisdictions there-
fore causing a conflict as to what law should be applied. But when the
court has determined where the contract was made, which must neces-
sarily be a particular jurisdiction, there can be no uncertainty as there
is only one law to apply, namely that where the contract was made.
Therefore it is submitted that in all future cases the Kentucky court
should determine the validity of the contracts before it according to the
law of the place where the contract is made.
JAEs D. ALLEN
MARRIED WOMEN'S SURETYSHIP CONTRACTS IN THE UNITED
STATES.
The married woman's contractual disabilities have been removed
to varying degrees in most American jurisdictions. Upon examination
of the statutes, virtually the only limitatlon upon the total removal
of these disabilities seems to be as to a married woman's capacity to
be a surety. It is the purpose of this note to discuss the capacity of
married women to be sureties in the various states.
"Stumberg, Conflict of Laws (1937) 201 where he cites Beale,
Goodrich and Minor as supporting the rule. Stumberg seems to dis-
agree with the rule, 204-207. Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934)
sec. 332 adopts the rule that the law of the place where the contract
is made should govern its validity.
22 See Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (1927) 220.
22 Beale, Conflict of Laws (1935) 1090; Goodrich, Conflict of Laws
(1927) 229, "It takes the sanction of the law plus the acts of the parties
to complete the contract."
'2 Beale, op. cit. 8 upra note 23, at 1091.
'Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Lacer, 122 Ky. 839, 93 S. W. 34
(1906) shows the difficulty.
STUDENT NoTs
It seems that American jurisdictions fall into three distinct classi-
fications with respect to the subject under discussion:
I. Married women may be sureties for anyone.
II. Married women may be sureties to a limited extent.
IIL Married women may not be sureties for anyone.
I
In the majority of American jurisdictions, the married woman
may, apparently, enter into and be liable on a suretyship contract as
if she were a feme sole. This rule obtains in the following jurisdic-
tions: Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District
of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York. North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Ten-
nessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
and Wyoming?
2Ark.-Pope's Dig. of Stat. of Ark. (1937), sec. 7227. See also
Walker v. Arkansas National Bank, 256 Fed. 1 (1919), holding that a
married woman could be a surety on her husband's note.
Calif.-Calif. C. C. (1937), sec. 158. See also C. I. T. Corp. v. San-
derson, 43 Fed. (2d) 985 (1930).
Colo.-Courtright Mills Ann. Stats. of Colo. (1928), sec. 4759. See
Patrick v. Morrow, 33 Colo. 509, 81 P. 242 (1905), holding that a married
woman may validly contract for any purpose. This would seem to
Indicate that her suretyship contracts would be valid.
Conn.--Gen. Stat. of Conn. (1930), see. 5154.
Del.-Del. Rev. Code (1935), sec. 3541. See Industrial Trust Co. v.
Cantera, 5 W. W. Harr. 364, 165 A. 338 (1933), wife could be surety for
her husband.
Dist. of Col.-Code (1929), title 14, secs. 43, 44.
Ill.-Ill. R. S. (1937), Chap. 68, sec. 6.
Ind.-Burns Ind. Stat. (1933), sec. 38-101.
Iowa-Code (1931), sec. 10466.
La.-La. Gen. Stats. (1932), secs. 2169, 2171. See Howard v. Car-
della, 171 La. 921, 132 So. 501 (1931), holding that a woman may be
surety for her husband. And see note (1933), 8 Tulane L. R. 106 for a
discussion of married women's acts in Louisiana with cases cited there-
under.
Me.-MNe. Rev. Stat. (1930), c. 74, secs. 1, 4. It seems that the
statutes here cited do not authorize a married woman to contract,
except, perhaps, by implication. However, Maine formerly had a statute
permitting married women to bind themselves by contract for any
lawful purpose. See Mayo v. Hutchinson, 57 Me. 546 (1870), holding
that a contract of suretyship is valid and binding on a married woman.
This case, apparently, has not been overruled and is still law under the
present statutes of Maine.
Md.-Md. Ann. Code (Bagby's 1924), Art. 45, sec. 5.
Mass.-Mass. Gen. Laws (1932), c. 209, sec. 2.
Minn.-Minn. Gen. Stat. (1923), secs. 1816-1820.
Miss.-Code (1930), see. 1940.
Mo.-IIo. Rev. Stat. (1929), sec. 2998. See Grandy v. Campbell,
L. J.-6
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II
In six states married women have been given a general right to
contract, but as to their right to become sureties, their actions are
limited, either by statutory provision or by decision. The theories
behind imposing these limitations, based upon giving some kind of pro-
tection to married women, will, be discussed in connection with the
rules as they are found to exist in the various states.
In Alabama a married woman has, generally, full contractual capac-
ity,' but it is expressly provided by statute that she shall not, directly
or indirectly, contract as surety for her husband.2 This statutory pro-
78 Mo. App. 502 (1899), holding that a woman could bind herself as
surety for her husband.
Mont.-Rev. Code (1935), sec. 5811.
Nev.-Nev. Comp. Laws (1929), secs. 3373, 3390, 3391, and 3393.
A married woman upon obtaining a court order may become a sole
trader. Sec. 3392 says that a married woman as a sole trader is liable
on contracts as if she were ferne sole.
N. J.-N. J. Rev. Stat. (1937), 3712-16.
N. Mex.--N. Mex. Stats. (1929), see. 68-201. See First Say. Bank
& Trust Co. v. Flournoy, 24 N. M. 256, 171 P. 793 (1917), holding that
a married woman is liable on contract as accommodation maker (infor-
mal suretyship).
N. Y.-Cahill's Cons. Laws of N. Y. (1930), c. 14, sec. 51.
N. C.-Code (1927), sec. 2507. See Royal v. Southerland, 168 N. C.
405, 84 S. E. 708 (1915), wife may be surety on husband's obligations;
Bristol Grocery Co. v. Bails, 177 N. C. 298, 98 S. E. 768 (1919), wife
jointly and severally liable as partner or surety.
N. D.-N. D. Comp. Laws (1913), sec. 4411.
Ohio--Code (Page's 1938), see. 7999.
Okla.-Okla. Stats. (1931), sec. 1655. See Temple v. State, 74 Okla.
215, 178 P. 113 (1919), married woman may be surety on an appearance
bond.
Ore.-Code (1930), secs. 33-201, 33-205, 33-211, and 33-215. See
also First National Bank v. Leonard, 36 Ore. 390, 59 P. 873 (1900).
R. I-R. I. Gen. Laws (1923), see. 4195.
S. C.-S. C. Const., Art. XVII, see. 9; C. C. (1932), see 8575.
S. D.-S. D. Comp. L. (1929), see. 171.
Tenn.--Code (1932), sec. 8460.
Utah-Utah Rev. Stat. (1933), Title 40-2-2.
Vt.-Vt. Pub. Laws (1933), sec. 3074.
Va.--Code (1930), sec. 5134.
Wash.-Code (Pierce's 1929), sec. 1430.
W. Va.-Civil Code (1931), sec. 48-3-9.
Wis.-Wis. Stat. (1936), sec. 6.015. See First Wisconsin Nat. Bank
v. Milwaukee Patent Leather Co., 179 Wis. 117, 190 N. W. 822 (1922),
holding liable a married woman who is accommodation indorser on a
note (in effect a surety) under this section.
Wyo.-Wyo. Rev. Stat. (1931), see. 69-102. In some of these states,
where no cases have been cited, the point has apperently not been
passed upon, but it is assumed from the tenor of the statute that these
statutes will follow the majority in allowing a married woman to be a
surety, when a case arises under the statute.
2Ala. Code (1923), sec. 8267.
"Id. see. 8272. See also Hall v. Clark, 225 Ala. 87, 142 So. 65 (1932),
holding that where wife signed note as surety for pre-existing debt of
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vision is also found in New Hampshire.' It would seem that these
states have gone to the extreme in severing the unity of husband and
wife by making it impossible for her to subject herself to liability for
his debts. The theory behind such a law, if any logical theory can be
deduced therefrom, is probably that the wife, when asked to become a
surety for her husband, might not feel the same freedom of action that
she would when asked to become a surety for someone who did not
exercise so much influence over her.
Kentucky has a statutory provision to the effect that a married
woman may not bind herself as surety for her husband or another
unless specific property has been set aside for that purpose by an appro-
priate instrument.5
There is some question, from the language of the Kentucky cases
on this point, as to whether the married woman may ever be a surety,
that is, whether she may set aside the property alluded to in the statute.
Cook v. LandriviO leaves the impression that the wife may not be a
surety for anyone, in the usual sense, and that all the statute gives her
Is the right to pledge property for another's debt. So, it would seem
that in Kentucky the only right given to a married woman with respect
to contracting for the debt or default of another, is to pledge specific
property which will be liable for that debt or default.
This rule also obtains in Idaho, Kansas and Nebraska, despite the
fact that in these states there are statutes which purport to remove all
common law contractual disabilities of married women.7
In Idaho, one of the leading cases on this point is Bank of Com-
merce v. Ba~dwWs in which it was held that the Idaho statute which
apparently gave the married woman general contractual capacity did
not permit her to bind herself as surety. Still another leading case,
Tipton v. Ellsworth,' holds that the wife could make a valid mortgage
to secure her husband's debt, but, after the mortgaged property was
exhausted, a deficiency decree against her was improper.
her husband, she had a good defense under this section: Hawkins v.
King, 228 Ala. 199, 153 So. 283 (1934), holding that a wife may not
become surety for her husband's debt.
4New Hampshire Pub. Laws (1928), c. 288, sec. 2.
rKy. Stats. (Carroll's 1936), see. 2127. See Travers v. Wood, 20
K. L. R. 1819, 50 S. W. 60 (1899), wife cannot bind herself as surety
for husband except by setting aside property for that purpose by mort-
gage or other conveyance under sec. 2127; Planters Bank & Trust Co.
v. Major, 25 K. L. R. 702, 68 S. W. 331 (1903); Cook v. Landrum, 26
K. L. R. 813, 82 S. W. 585 (1904); Hites v. Reynolds, 163 Ky. 502, 173
S. W. 1108 (1915).
6 upra n. 5.
'Idaho Code (1932), secs. 31-904, 31-912; Kansas R. S. (1923),
sec. 23-202; Nebraska Comp. Stat. (1929), sec. 42-202.
'114 Idaho 75, 93 P. 504 (1908).
'18 Idaho 207, 109 P. 134 (1910). See also Jacobs, The Law of
Community Property in Idaho, 1 Idaho L. J. 118 (1931).
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In Kansas, in the case of Deering v. Boyle,2 it is held that when
a married woman becomes a surety, she does not bind herself person-
ally, but she binds her separate estate. It is suggested by this case that
the married woman is liable for impliedly agreeing to bind her separate
estate by executing the suretyship contract, that is, she impliedly binds
all separate property not exempted from execution by law. She could
not be held liable, personally, and there can be no deficiency judgment
against her after the separate property is exhausted. In Nebraska, In
First National Bank v. Ernst," the rule that a married woman's surety-
ship contract is only binding if it shows her intention to bind her
separate estate, is clearly laid down.
It would seem, then, that in these three states, the rule is the
same as that laid down by an express statute in Kentucky, despite
the fact that there are express statutes purporting to grant com-
plete contractual freedom in all three jurisdictions. The theory
behind such a rule is probably based upon the old common law idea
that the woman was helpless and did not know what she was doing.
By evidencing her intent to bind her separate estate, the married woman
clearly shows that she is aware of what she is doing.
III
In the remaining six jurisdictions, the right of married women to
become sureties is totally denied. One jurisdiction, Arizona, has a stat-
ute which purports to remove all disabilities,2 but In the case of Stiles
v. Lord, the court cited this statutory provision and held that, despite
it, the wife could not make a contract of suretyship or guaranty, so that
it would seem that in Arizona the married woman may not be a surety,
since it does not appear that this case has ever been overruled.
By statute in Florida, the wife has no general power to contract;
her separate property remains under the care and management of her
husband. 4 However, the wife is permitted to petition the circuit court
praying for license to take charge and control of her separate property,
to contract freely and to bind herself as if she were unmarried. If this
10 8 Kansas 525 at 531 (1871). It is logical to assume that the rule
which obtains in Kansas would be the same as the rule clearly laid
down in the Idaho cases cited supra n. 7 and 8, since the laws of Idaho
are taken directly from Kansas. See also Live Stock Commission Co.
v. Haston, 68 Kan. 749, 75 P. 1028 (1904), and Moody v. Stubbs, 94 Kan.
250, 146 P. 346 (1915), both holding that the wife could mortgage
her separate property as collateral for note given to secure pre-existing
indebtedness of her husband.
'2117 Neb. 34, 219 N. W. 798 (1928). See also Grand Island Bank-
ing Co. v. Wright, 53 Neb. 574, 74 N. W. 82 (1898), holding that the
burden of proving that the married woman intended to bind her
separate estate by contract is on the promisee.
"Arizona Rev. Code (1928), sec. 2174.
"12 Ariz. 154, 11 P. 314 (1886). Cf. Prof. Williston's view that
married women are completely emancipated in Arizona, 1 Williston on
Contracts, sec. 269 (1936 revision).
11Florida Gen. Laws (1927), secs. 5024, 5027.
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petition is granted she may contract as if unmarried. If this permis-
sion is given by the court as a matter of course, then Florida belongs
In Class II.
Georgia has an express statute to the effect that a married woman
may not bind her estate by any contact of suretyship,5 and this pro-
vision is the basis for a unanimous holding to this effect in all the
cases which were found on this point in Georgia.
A Michigan statute provides that the separate estate (real or per-
sonal) of a married woman acquired after marriage" shall remain her
separate estate, that it should not be liable for her husband's debts, and
that it can be contracted, sold, transferred, bequeathed or devised as if
she were single. However, despite this apparently broad statute, the
court in Russell v. People's ;Savings Bank,17 indicated that the statute
had Its limits, holding that a contract of suretyship is not one by which
the married woman contracts, sells, transfers, mortgages or conveys her
own property or any part of it, and is, therefore, not within the mean-
ing of the statute. This position has uniformly been supported in
cases following the Russell case, so that it seems that the law of surety-
ship In Michigan at present is correctly laid down by that case."
The law on this question in Pennsylvania is settled by an express
statute which provides that a married woman may contract as If
unmarried except that she may not be surety for another." The cases
in this connection will not be here discussed, since they have been col-
lected and adequately discussed by another writer."
The statutes in Texas give the wife neither express nor implied
general power to contract," and she may not become personally bound
as surety. The contractual capacity of the wife in Texas, is well
summed up in the case of Lee v. Hall Music Co.12 in the following words:
"Our statutes impliedly invest the wife with power to contract for
necessaries for herself and children as well as for such expenses as are
incidental to the control and management of her separate estate and
such community property as the statute commits to her charge. .
25Georgia Code (1914), see. 3007. See Mobley v. Brown, 38 Ga. App.
440, 144 S. E. 143 (1928); Trust Co. of Ga. v. Cerf, 46 Ga. App. 678, 168
S. E. 921 (1933).
16Mich. Comp. Laws (1929), see. 13057.
"39 Mich. 671, 673 (1878).
Howe v. North, 69 Mich. 272, 37 N. W. 213 (1888), wife cannot be
surety for husband; Fitzgerald v. Harry I. Garson Productions, 221
Mich. 88, 190 N. W. 695 (1922), contract by married woman as surety
for corporation held invalid, even though she owned a large block of
stock in the corporation; Monroe State Say. Bank v. Orloff, 232 Mich.
486, 205 N. W. 596 (1925), married woman may not bind her separate
property to pay another's debt.
"Penn. Stats. (1936), Title 48, sec. 32.
"Reader, Married Women's Contracts of Suretyship, 38 Dickinson
L. R. 230 (1934).
'5Texas Stats. (1936), Art. 4614, 4623.
= 120 Tex. 14, 35 S. W. (2d) 685, 687 (1931). See also Coleman v.
State, 116 Tex. Cr. Rep. 46, 28 S. W. (2d) 114 (1930), married woman
may not be surety on bail bond without joinder of her husband.
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She also has implied power under article 4623 to become, jointly with
her husband, the joint [italics added] maker of a note or a surety
on any bond or obligation of another." So it would seem that
if the husband does not consent to become jointly bound with his wife
as surety, she may not so bind herself. However, if the consent of the
husband is to be considered as a matter of course, then Texas belongs
in Class II.
The theory behind the rule in this third class is that the law, while
it has removed the wife's disabilities with regard to the ownership and
disposition of property, should nevertheless protect the interest of the
feme covert from being wasted and impaired by the assumption, through
undue family influence, of debts for the benefit of others. While these
states are willing to remove disabilities for her interest, they were not
willing to allow her to enter into contracts from which no benefit could
be derived. PTTLrn, SonrI"
INHERITANCE TAX UPON FAILURE TO EXERCISE SPECIAL
POWER OF APPOINTMENT.
Property may be deeded or devised subject to the exercise of two
types of powers, namely, general and special. Under a general power
the donee is unrestricted in his selection of the person or persons to
whom he may appoint;1 under a special power his selection is restricted
to a named class or group2 Generally, when property is deeded or
devised subject to the exercise of a power, the donor provides that it
shall pass to a certain person or persons in default of an exercise of
the power by the donee. This note will be devoted to a discussion of the
imposition of a succession tax upon the failure of the donee to exercise
a special power.
Under the Federal Estate Tax Act,3 property subject to a general
power of appointment is made a part of the gross estate of the donee
for the purpose of computing the estate tax, but only when the power
is exercised and the property appointed to someone other than the
person or persons named to take in default of an exercise of the
power.'
Most state statutes impose a succession tax upon the passage of
the property to the beneficiary at the death of the donee, whether
1 Leser v. Burnet, 46 F. (2d) 756 (1931); Johnstone v. Comr. of
Internal 'Revenue, 76 F. (2d( 55 (1935), certiorari denied 56 S. Ct. 89,
296 U. S. 578, 80 L. Ed. 408 (1935); St. Matthews Bank v. De Charette,
259 Ky. 802, 83 S. W. (2d) 471 (1935); Lyon v. Alexander, 304 Pa. 288,
156 At. 84, 76 A. L. R. 1427 (1931).
2Id
326 U.S.C.A. see. 411(f). Mississippi also has a similar statute,
Miss. Code (1930), sec. 5069.
4Helvering v. Grinnell, 294 U. S. 153, 55 S. Ct. 354 (1935).
5Arizona Rev. Code (Struckmeyer, 1928) see. 3160; Colo. Sees.
Laws (1933) Chap. 106, see. 2(8); Idaho Code (1932) sec. 14-402(6);
Kan. Rev. Stat. (1923) sec. 79-1520; Ky. Stat. (Carroll, 1936) sec.
4281a-14; Mass. Gen. Laws (1932) Chap. 65, sec. 2; Mich. Comp. Laws
